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ABSTRACT 
We model the milk and dairy industry in California focusing on the production, 
processing, and distribution of bulk milk at the county level. We analyze the sensitivity of 
this industry when faced with worst-case disruptions, where a “worst-case” disruption 
corresponds to the greatest shortage of milk supply throughout California. The major 
highways in California are used to connect all of the counties and illustrate where the 
bulk milk is moving. We utilize Attacker-Defender (AD) modeling techniques to 
determine where worst-case disruptions occur. This reveals vulnerabilities within the 
milk and dairy industry. We examine three specific scenarios: (1) a quarantine of each 
county due to a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak or any other event that would 
cause the complete stoppage of production, processing and movement of milk in a county 
over a seven day period; (2) 1 to 15 attacks on the milk and dairy industry in a 45 day 
time period; and (3) the isolation of Northern and Southern California over a seven day 
time period that could be caused by a natural disaster. 
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................5 
A. MILK AND DAIRY INDUSTRY ...................................................................5 
B. ATTACKER DEFENDER MODELING ......................................................6 
C. CURRENT TOOLS .........................................................................................6 
D. OUR CONTRIBUTION IN CONTEXT ........................................................7 
III. MODEL FORMULATION.........................................................................................9 
A. NETWORK MODEL ......................................................................................9 
B. FULL MODEL ...............................................................................................13 
C. DATA COLLECTION ..................................................................................17 
1. Transportation Network ...................................................................17 
2. Bulk Milk Production ........................................................................17 
3. Level One and Level Two Processing of Bulk Milk ........................18 
4. Transportation of Milk ......................................................................19 
5. Demand for Bulk Milk.......................................................................21 
D. MATHEMATICAL MODEL .......................................................................21 
1. The Operator’s Problem ...................................................................21 
2. Attacker Defender Problem ..............................................................23 
3. Solving AD Model ..............................................................................25 
IV. RESULTS ...................................................................................................................27 
A. IMPACT FROM A FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK ........27 
1. Scenario: Processed Milk Not Being Able to Reach Population....27 
2. Scenario: Processed Milk Able to Reach Population......................29 
B. RESILIENCY OF THE MILK AND DAIRY INDUSTRY IN 
CALIFORNIA WHEN FACING WORST CASE SCENARIOS .............31 
C. IMPACT FROM SPLITTING NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA ................................................................................................34 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................39 
APPENDIX A: DATA TABLE LISTING THE CAPACITIES FOR ALL OF 
THE MILK AND DAIRY INDUSTRY COMPONENTS IN EACH 
COUNTY IN CALIFORNIA ....................................................................................41 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................43 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................45 
 
 viii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Flow of milk through the milk and dairy process found in FASCAT. We 
use this process flow to form our abstraction of the FASCAT model, 
which, focuses on the dairy farms and the first and second processing 
levels (from NCFPD, 2011). ............................................................................10 
Figure 2. Abstraction of the bulk milk process flow with a transportation network. 
Our abstraction focuses on the dairy farms, first level and second level 
processing facilities, and the transportation of bulk milk throughout 
California. This figure represents a single county. Light gray nodes 
represent an abstraction of FASCAT. Medium gray nodes represent 
transportation. Dark gray nodes represent exits from the county. ...................11 
Figure 3. Transportation network connecting all of the counties in California. Our 
network contains a single node for each county in California. The edges 
connecting counties were derived primarily from highways US-101, I-5,    
I-10, US-395, I-15, CA-99 Background image is from Digital-Topos-
Maps.com. (Digital-Topos-Maps.com, 2011)..................................................12 
Figure 4. Illustration of the movement of bulk milk through three different time 
layers or days. This illustration shows how milk changes time layers. The 
bullets indicate that milk can change time layers when going through the 
first or second level of processing and when milk enters the transportation 
network. ...........................................................................................................13 
Figure 5. Simplified representation of bulk milk movement through the processing 
facilities to the population. We annotate the upper and lower bounds on 
the arcs that control the flow of milk. We account for the different time 
layers in each of the nodes with t, t+1, t+2 or t+3. ..........................................16 
Figure 6. Milk Haul Regions in California (From CDFA 2010d)...................................20 
Figure 7. Graph of the results from 15 attacks over a 45 day time period. This graph 
show the shortages in bulk milk felt throughout California ............................33 
Figure 8. Illustration of which counties are attacked in our AD model of the milk 
and dairy industry. The counties that are attacked are highlighted in 
yellow. The figure for 1 and 5 attacks highlight the counties to which the 
California Milk and dairy industry is most sensitive. Multiple attack 
strategies exist that cause the same worst-case shortage. The pictures 
above show one specific attack strategy for the scenarios depicted. ...............34 
Figure 9. Flow of milk in California when there is a cut between Monterey and San 
Luis Obispo, Madera and Fresno, and finally Merced and Fresno Counties. 
The arcs connecting the milk and dairy industry between counties have 
varying thicknesses to account for differing amounts of milk flowing 
between them. ..................................................................................................35 
Figure 10. Flow of milk in California when there is a cut between San Luis Obispo 
and Santa Barbara, Kings and Kern, and Tulare and Kerns Counties. The 
chart at the right shows the comparison between the shortages of milk in 
each county compared to the total demand of milk over seven days. ..............36 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Data table for Tulare County of the capacities on the arcs in our full 
model. The capacities for each of these arcs are measured in lbs. ...................21 
Table 2. Ranking of counties by shortages of bulk milk in California caused by a 
FMD outbreak. The amount of shortage is in pounds of bulk milk 
quarantine is over a seven day time period. .....................................................29 
Table 3. Ranking of counties by shortages of bulk milk in California caused by a 
FMD outbreak when process milk can move to consumers in a 
quarantined county. The amount of shortage is in pounds of bulk milk and 
the quarantine is over a seven day time period. ...............................................30 
Table 4. Bulk milk shortage in Southern California Counties when there is a cut 
between San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara, Kings and Kern, and Tulare 
and Kerns Counties. .........................................................................................37 
 
 xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AD   Attacker-Defender 
CalEMA  California Emergency Management Agency 
CARVER-Shock Criticality Accessibility Recuperability Vulnerability Effect, 
   Recognizability  
CDFA   California Department of Food and Agriculture 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
FASCAT  Food Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool 
FMD   Foot and Mouth Disease 
MDFS   Milk and Dairy Food Safety Branch 
NAADSM  North American Agriculture Disease Spread Model 
USDA   United States Department of Agriculture 
US FDA  United States Food and Drug Administration 
 
 xiv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xv 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis analyzes the milk and dairy industry in California focusing on the 
production, processing, and distribution of bulk milk at the county level. The model we 
use examines the sensitivity of this industry when faced with worst-case disruptions. We 
utilize Attacker Defender (AD) modeling techniques to determine where worst-case 
disruptions occur. This informs us where vulnerabilities exist within the milk and dairy 
industry. We examine three specific scenarios: (1) a quarantine of each county due to a 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak or any other event that would cause the 
complete stoppage of production, processing and movement of milk in a county over a 
seven day period; (2) 1 to 15 attacks on the milk and dairy industry in a 45 day time 
period; and (3) the isolation of Northern and Southern California over a seven day time 
period that could be cause by a natural disaster. 
In our model, we create a network that approximates the flow of milk starting at 
the dairy farms where milk production occurs, moving to processing facilities, and 
eventually getting to the consumers in California. We use an abstraction from the Food 
Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) as our basis for the milk and 
dairy industry, and we incorporate major highways into the network to connect all of the 
counties in California. We also take into account the rapid movement of milk by 
introducing a time component to the model. The resulting model enables us to estimate 
where the worst-case disruptions occur and analyze the impact of varying disruption 
scenarios. 
Our model produces key insights into the milk and dairy industry. We learn that 
the overall milk and dairy industry is able to be very responsive to worst-case disruptions, 
and that five simultaneous attacks are necessary to cause shortages to California 
consumers. We also learn that separating Northern and Southern California, as may be 
caused temporarily by large-scale flooding can have drastic consequences to the supply 
of bulk milk, causing shortages in Southern California. 
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified agriculture as a 
critical infrastructure for the United States. The agriculture industry is vulnerable to both 
intentional and unintentional disruptions. One large concern is an intentional disruption 
caused by agro-terrorism. “Agro-terrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as 
the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, 
causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability” (Monke, 2007). The 
agriculture industry is also vulnerable to an unintentional disruption such as an outbreak 
of foot and mouth disease (FMD) (Hagerman, McCarl, Carpenter, & O’Brien 2009). 
These disruptions have the potential for loss of life, as well as widespread economic and 
social ramifications (DHS, 2007). 
The State of California and the nation as a whole would be greatly affected by a 
disruption to the milk and dairy industry in California. California is the largest producer 
of agriculture products in the United States. The California agriculture industry generates 
36 billion dollars in sales annually. California’s milk and dairy production accounted for 
5.9 billion dollars in sales in 2009, making California the nation’s leading dairy producer 
(CDFA, 2010a). During that year, California’s milk and dairy industry produced 21% of 
the nation’s milk supply with 40.4 billion pounds of bulk milk. The number of people 
employed by the dairy industry in California is 400,000. California’s milk and dairy 
products are not only used locally, but they are shipped throughout the United States as 
well as exported overseas.  
The milk and dairy supply chain is comprised of dairy farms, processing facilities, 
wholesale distribution centers, and retailers. The supply chain begins when dairy farms 
produce raw milk. The raw milk is supplied to creameries that process the raw milk into 
consumable milk or other dairy products. Once processing is complete, milk is shipped 
out for further processing before going to wholesale distributors. From the wholesale 
distributors, the milk goes to the retailers where it is purchased by consumers. This is a 
general flow of the farm-to-table continuum for milk.  
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Two state agencies that are particularly concerned about the well-being of the 
milk and dairy industry in California are the California Department of Food and 
Agriculture (CDFA) and the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA). 
CDFA oversees the regulations that directly affect the milk and dairy industry through 
their Milk and Dairy Food Safety Branch (MDFS). MDFS ensures the quality and safety 
of the dairy industry by inspecting dairy farms and milk processing plants, collecting 
samples of bulk milk to assure consumer safety, ensuring that tests used to determine 
payment are accurate, and evaluating the dairy farms, milk plants, and laboratories for the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (US FDA) (CDFA, 2011). CalEMA is in 
charge of the coordination and response to major disasters in support of local 
governments. They are also responsible for the states readiness to respond and recover 
from all hazards to include natural, manmade, war caused emergencies, and disasters 
(CalEMA, 2011). CalEMA works closely with DHS on their efforts for security to 
critical infrastructures at the state level. These two state agencies work together in 
examining possible vulnerabilities to the milk and dairy industry. 
There are multiple concerns about the vulnerabilities of the milk and dairy 
industry. One such concern is an interruption to the supply chain resulting in shortages 
for consumers. This scenario would impact not only infants and elderly consumers, but 
also the producers, processors, and shippers within the milk and dairy industry in 
California. Depending on the duration and severity of the interruption to the milk supply, 
market share may be lost to out-of-state dairy producers. A second concern is an 
interruption in processing to the milk and dairy supply chain where raw milk cannot be 
processed and requires disposal. This is a concern due to the fact that raw milk has the 
potential to be an environmental hazard if disposed of improperly. A final concern is 
either a deliberate or non-deliberate contamination of the milk supply. This is a concern 
because a contamination can quickly spread to consumers through the existing 
distribution channels of the milk and dairy industry. The consequences in this scenario 
are also severe due to the high velocity of the milk supply chain and the number of 
people who could consume the contaminated milk. 
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This thesis focuses on assessing the impact of disruptions or delays to the milk 
and dairy industry. We develop a network flow model of the normal daily operations of 
bulk milk movement in California. The network is made up of milk production, 
processing and consumption in each California county, and it also includes the major 
roadways connecting counties. This model of daily operations gives us an appreciation of 
the speed and complexity of the milk and dairy industry. We use the model to identify the 
locations of worst-case disruptions. We define a worst-case disruption to mean a 
disruption that causes the greatest amount of shortage in milk supply throughout the state 
of California. Collectively, these scenarios help us to assess the responsiveness of the 
milk and dairy industry when disruptions occur. We do not analyze the impact of 
contamination to the milk and dairy supply or the effects of disposal of large amount of 
bulk milk. 
Using this model, we investigate the impact of three disruption scenarios and 
perform analysis to determine which entities are critical within the milk and dairy 
industry in California. The first scenario that we examine is a FMD outbreak in a single 
county. By considering each county in turn, we identify the critical counties in the milk 
and dairy industry. In the second scenario, we examine where worst-case disruptions 
occur to the milk production processing, and distribution in each county. We determine 
the severity of the disruption by computing the demand for milk that is not met by 
California’s milk and dairy industry. Finally, we analyze an isolation of one part of 
California from another, for example due to flooding. 
The rest of the thesis reviews previous work within this subject, documents the 
methodology that we use to obtain our results, analyzes several case studies, and reports 
our conclusions. 
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We briefly review three main topic areas in the academic literature that give 
context to this thesis. The first area of research is modeling the effects of deliberate 
contamination to the milk and dairy industry, and effects of foreign animal disease 
outbreaks. The second area of related research is the Attacker-Defender (AD) style of 
models developed at Naval Postgraduate School. Finally, we review the tools currently 
used for analysis by CDFA and CalEMA, because these tools serve as a starting point for 
our network flow model. 
A. MILK AND DAIRY INDUSTRY 
Liu and Wein (2005) analyze the effect of a deliberate contamination to the milk 
and dairy industry in California using a hypothetical scenario in which, a terrorist 
introduces a botulinum toxin. They argue that a relatively small amount of the 
contaminant introduced in either the holding tank at the dairy farm, the truck transporting 
milk, or the bulk milk holding silos at the processing plants could lead to consumer 
casualties. Their model estimates that 568,000 people would get sick from poisoning on 
the introduction of one gram of botulinum toxin. Their article demonstrates the potential 
effect of one vulnerability within the milk and dairy industry and its impact on a large 
portion of the population. Due to this and other possible potential vulnerabilities, analysis 
within the milk and dairy industry is important.  
Hagerman et al. (2009) document the economic impact of a FMD outbreak to the 
milk and dairy industry in California. Their research provides a quantitative approach to 
assist decision makers on the impact of differing strategies for prevention, intervention, 
and recovery. In their analysis, they simulate three different scenarios, one with no 
vaccination during a FMD outbreak, one with a 10 Km ring of vaccinated dairy cows, 
and the last scenario is with a 20 Km ring of vaccinated dairy cows. They adjusted five 
parameters that deal with the length of time to detect a FMD disease outbreak of 7 days, 
10 days, 14 days, 21 days, and 22 days. Their analysis suggests that a best case scenario, 
in which, officials use a 10 Km ring of vaccinating dairy cows and determine an outbreak 
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after just seven days, they estimate a direct economic loss of 3,956.72 695.4±  (2004$M). 
In the worst case scenario, corresponding to the use of 20 Km vaccination ring and not 
finding the outbreak until day 22, they estimate a direct economic loss of 
71,682.91 6906.07±  (2004$M). The size of this potential economic impact on California 
demonstrates the need for additional analysis on impacts to the milk and dairy industry 
from a FMD outbreak. We specifically model a scenario concerning a FMD outbreak at 
the level of a single county in California. 
B. ATTACKER DEFENDER MODELING 
Our model formulation and analysis of the milk and dairy industry follows the 
attacker-defender (AD) models presented in Brown et al. (2005, 2006). These articles 
introduce the idea of AD bi-level optimization models to determine where the worst case 
attacks by an intelligent adversary could occur in a system. The starting point is a 
“defender” or “operator” model that prescribes the activities that yield the best possible 
system performance (e.g., minimize lost or maximize throughput). The “attacker” is a 
hypothetical adversary who wants to disrupt system performance (e.g., maximize cost or 
minimize throughput). The AD model finds the attacks that result in worst-case system 
performance, even after the defender had responded in the best possible manner. We 
apply the AD modeling techniques in our analysis of the milk and dairy industry.  
C. CURRENT TOOLS 
There are several tools used by CDFA and CalEMA to assess vulnerabilities to 
the milk and dairy industry in California. The tools that the state agencies are currently 
using are the Food Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT), Criticality 
Accessibility Recuperability Vulnerability Effect Recognizability (CARVER-Shock), and 
the North American Agriculture Disease Spread Model (NAADSM). All of these tools 
were developed at the federal level by United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
and DHS. 
FASCAT is a data collection tool used by state agriculture and emergency 
management agencies. Either USDA or DHS solicits a “data call” for information on the 
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impact of certain predetermined scenarios from their state agency partners (CDFA and 
CalEMA). FASCAT helps to collect responses from each of the states. The responses are 
collected, and the scenarios are ranked based on severity of impact. This ranked list is 
used to determine where limited funding can go to make the different sectors in the food 
and agriculture industry more resilient (FASCAT version 1.2, 2009). The drawback from 
using FASCAT is that it does not take into account real operational data, such as 
production quantities for dairy farms in a state, to determine the impact of differing worst 
case scenarios. The next version of FASCAT called FASTRANS promises to analyze the 
effects of transportation issues on differing agriculture commodities (Beckham, Hoffman, 
and Orosz, 2011).  
CARVER-Shock differs from FASCAT in that it attempts to identify 
vulnerabilities by having each user answer multiple questions about their farm, ranch, or 
area of responsibility. Carver-Shock is designed to be used by multiple levels within the 
agriculture industry. This includes people working for state agriculture agencies all the 
way down to the individual farm or ranch owners. Once all of the questions are answered, 
the user receives a report on the vulnerabilities for their area of responsibility. This tool 
helps farmers determine where vulnerabilities exist (FDA, 2010). 
NAADSM is a tool that uses a stochastic simulation to estimate the spread of a 
foreign animal disease outbreak (Hill & Reeves, 2006). The second most important 
scenario that concerns CDFA is an outbreak of foot and mouth disease (CDFA 2010c). 
While we are also concerned about the effects to the milk and dairy industry of a foot and 
mouth disease outbreak, the NAADSM tool was not used in this research.   
D. OUR CONTRIBUTION IN CONTEXT 
The basic model in this thesis can be used for additional analysis on 
vulnerabilities of other agriculture commodities. Chapter 3 details our approach to tying 
the process flow of the milk and dairy industry with a transportation network. 
Additionally it shows how we collected the data for use in our model, as well as the 
mathematical formulation we use to determine where worst case disruptions occur in 
different scenarios. 
 8 
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III. MODEL FORMULATION 
We build our model in three steps. In the first step, we develop a network from an 
abstraction of the milk and dairy process flow in FASCAT, and we overlay a 
transportation network consisting of major roadways that connect the counties in 
California. The second step is data collection and extrapolation for the amounts of bulk 
milk produced, processed, and distributed. The final step is the development of the 
mathematical program that we use to solve for the amount of shortages of bulk milk that 
results in each county for each of several given scenarios.  
A. NETWORK MODEL 
We begin by examining the process flow of the milk and dairy industry used in 
FASCAT. The milk and dairy industry is comprised of dairy farms, processing facilities, 
wholesale warehouses, and finally retail stores. A visual depiction of the flow of milk 
through the FASCAT model is shown in Figure 1. Milk processing occurs in two levels. 
The first level of processing takes bulk raw milk as an input and then outputs pasteurized 
milk and other dairy products. The second level of processing takes the output from the 
first level and processes it further for specific dairy products. FASCAT models this 
process flow by connecting inputs that are required for dairy farms, production from the 
dairy farm to the first processing level, output from the first processing level to the 
second processing level, distribution of the finished products to wholesale warehouses, 
retail stores, and finally then to the consumer. We use this process flow to get an 
understanding of the entities that are involved within the dairy industry. Our next step is 
determining how we are going to take this process flow and create a mathematical model 
for our analysis. 
We take the information from FASCAT and create an abstraction to build our 
network of the milk and dairy industry. In our modeling, we focus on the production of 
bulk milk at the dairy farms and the processing of bulk milk at the first and second level 
creameries. We visually see this in the light gray highlighted nodes that are in Figure 2.  
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We also need to represent the physical movement of bulk milk between the dairy 
farms and milk processing centers.  
 
Figure 1.   Flow of milk through the milk and dairy process found in FASCAT. We use 
this process flow to form our abstraction of the FASCAT model, which, 
focuses on the dairy farms and the first and second processing levels (from 
NCFPD, 2011). 
Figure 2 displays the abstraction of FASCAT that we create for each California 
County. We create a transportation network consistent with this FASCAT framework that 
enables the milk to move from the farms to the creameries within a county and between 
counties. This is shown by the medium gray highlighted nodes connecting the farms and 
the creameries in Figure 2. We also define “level 1” and “level 2” as the two stages that 
can be used in processing of bulk milk. “Level 1” takes as input the raw milk from the 
farms and “level 2” does additional processing for specific dairy products. We see this 
separation with the dotted lines in Figure 2. Finally, we show that the movement of milk 
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ends with the population in the county, moves to another county, or goes out of state with 
the dark gray highlighted nodes in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Abstraction of the bulk milk process flow with a transportation network. 
Our abstraction focuses on the dairy farms, first level and second level 
processing facilities, and the transportation of bulk milk throughout 
California. This figure represents a single county. Light gray nodes 
represent an abstraction of FASCAT. Medium gray nodes represent 
transportation. Dark gray nodes represent exits from the county. 
This abstraction of the flow of milk from FASCAT represents the production, 
processing and movement of milk within each county in California. Our next step is to 
take this abstraction and add a transportation network. This allows us to connect all of the 
counties where milk production, processing, and consumption occur. The transportation 
network that we are using is visually depicted in Figure 3. This network connects the 
major roadways through each of the counties. Each node in Figure 3 is, in fact, a set of 
nodes like those depicted in Figure 2. 
Our final step in creating our milk and dairy network model is to introduce a time 
layering effect. This is essential to model since bulk milk moves extremely quickly from 
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production on the dairy farms through processing and finally to consumers. We take this 
effect into account by the milk and dairy industry with time periods. Each time period 
represents the movement from one day to the next. This is shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 3.   Transportation network connecting all of the counties in California. Our 
network contains a single node for each county in California. The edges 
connecting counties were derived primarily from highways US-101, I-5,    
I-10, US-395, I-15, CA-99 Background image is from Digital-Topos-
Maps.com. (Digital-Topos-Maps.com, 2011) 
The following is one example of the movement of milk through our network to 
include our time layering. If raw milk is processed in the same county where it is 
produced, the shipment from farm to creamery happens within the same time period. The 
following processes consume about a day in reality, and so the edges representing them 
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cross time layers: Shipping milk supplies between counties or processing milk either 
from raw to “level 1” or “level 1” to “level 2” each take one time layer. All other 
processes take considerably less time, and the edges representing them remain within the 
same layer. 
 
Figure 4.   Illustration of the movement of bulk milk through three different time layers 
or days. This illustration shows how milk changes time layers. The bullets 
indicate that milk can change time layers when going through the first or 
second level of processing and when milk enters the transportation network.  
B. FULL MODEL 
Our abstraction from FASCAT depicts the flow of milk from production to 
consumption for a single county in California. To solve our network model of the milk 
and dairy industry in California, we must expand our model by splitting the nodes seen in 
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Figure 2, and account for the time layers. This new network model for a single county is 
shown in Figure 5.  
We begin at the dairy farms and our first node, denoted FarmStart, which, 
connects to FarmEnd at time period t. Flow along the arc connecting these nodes 
accounts for the milk production on the dairy farms in the county. We set the lower and 
upper bound on this arc equal to the amount of raw milk each produced in this county. 
Because dairy farms must continuously produce milk, the lower bound cannot be zero. 
Also, the upper bound cannot exceed the capacity of raw milk that the milk producing 
cows can make in each county.  
Between the dairy farms and creameries in this county, we have a transportation 
node called Trans1. We label this node with time period t because transportation of raw 
milk from the farms happens on the same day. The arc connecting FarmEnd to Trans1 
has an upper bound to account for the number of milk haul trucks in that county. It has a 
lower bound of zero. Bulk raw milk can also enter Trans1 from raw milk produced in a 
different county, to reflect the case where milk produced in one county is processed in a 
different one. The arcs exiting out of Trans1 can either go to the first level of processing, 
Creamery1Start at time period, t, in the same county, or be transported to a different 
county, OtherRegion, to be processed at time period, t+1. We use a time period of t+1 
because it does not take any longer than a day to ship bulk milk from one part of 
California to another. The arc between Trans1 and Creamery1Start has a lower bound in 
order to keep a certain amount of bulk milk in the same county where it is produced. 
Milk processing within the county occurs in two levels. The first level of milk 
processing begins at the node Creamery1Start at time period t, and ends at the node 
Creamery1End at time period t+1 because this processing takes a single day. The arc 
connecting Creamery1Start and Creamery1End has an upper bound that signifies the 
maximum operating capacity of the level-one creameries in each county. The arc exiting 
Creamery1End at time period, t+1, connects to the second transportation node, Trans2 at 
time period, t+1.  
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The second transportation node, Trans2, has incoming arcs from Creamery1End 
at t+1 and from bulk milk coming in from a different county at time period t+2. The arcs 
exiting Trans2 connect to Population at time period, t+1, OtherRegion at time period, 
t+2, and the beginning of second level of milk processing, Creamery2Start. The node, 
Population is the end of the milk and dairy industry and represents the consumption of 
dairy products. The arc between Trans2 and Creamery2Start has a lower bound in order 
to keep a certain amount of bulk milk in the same county in which it is produced. 
The second level of milk processing begins at the node Creamery2Start at time 
period, t+1, and ends at Creamery2End at time period, t+2. The arc connecting these two 
nodes has an upper bound that signifies the maximum operating capacity of the level-two 
creameries. From Creamery2Start to Creamery2End, there is movement from one time 
layer to the next in order to account for the processing time at the creameries. The arc 
exiting Creamery2End connects to the third and final transportation node, Trans3, at time 
period, t+2.  
The final transportation node Trans3 has a second incoming arc from 
OtherRegion at time period t+3, and exiting arcs to OtherRegion at time period t+3 and 
to Population at time period t+2. The arc between Creamery2End and Trans3 has an 
upper bound to account for the trucking capacity within each county.  
We replicate this basic structure for each county to obtain a simplified 
representation of the entire milk and dairy industry in California. We take into account 
the rapid movement of milk through the system by introducing a time layered effect. We 
also focus on the production processing and transportation of milk throughout the state. 
Now that we have defined our full model, our next challenge is collecting the data.   
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Figure 5.   Simplified representation of bulk milk movement through the processing facilities to the population. We annotate the 
upper and lower bounds on the arcs that control the flow of milk. We account for the different time layers in each of the 
nodes with t, t+1, t+2 or t+3. 
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C. DATA COLLECTION 
The next step in our model formulation is the collection and evaluation of data we 
need to build our network and the inputs needed to perform our analysis. There are six 
key components that we need to build our model. They are the transportation road 
network, the amount of milk production in each county, the amount and capacity of level 
one processing of bulk milk at the creameries in each county, the amount and capacity of 
level two processing at the creameries in each county, the operating efficiency for milk 
hauling trucks, and the amount of bulk milk consumed per capita in each county. Using 
Tulare County as an example, we next explain how we derive each of these data values. 
Table 1 illustrates the inputs from Tulare County for our model. Appendix A contains the 
full data table of all of the capacities for each of the counties. 
1. Transportation Network 
We use state highway maps to determine the transportation network that we use to 
connect all of the counties in California as well as reaching out of (see Figure 3). Within 
our network, we assume that the roadways each have an infinite capacity. This means that 
there are no constraints placed on the amount of trucks that can move milk within each 
county’s production and processing capabilities, between counties, or between California 
and milk going out of state. This is a modeling decision that we made since we are 
tracking the number of trucks available and not the capacity on the roads. We assume that 
our transportation network is the only means in which, milk can move throughout the 
state.  
2. Bulk Milk Production 
The next piece of data that we need for our model is to know how much milk is 
produced in each county. We estimate the amount of bulk milk produced in each county 
by taking the amount of milk producing cows in each county and multiplying by the daily 
average amount of raw milk produced.  
RawMilkProd = NumMilkProdCows ×DailyAvgAmtMilkProdPerCow 
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We estimate the DailyAvgAmtMilProdPerCow by taking the total amount of milk 







We get the number of milk producing cows in each county from CDFA (CDFA 
2010a), for Tulare County this is 493,292 cows. We get the total milk production and 
total number of milk producing cows from CDFA (CDFA 2010a). The daily average 
amount of milk produced per cow is 57 lbs of milk. This information is used to calculate 
the amount of milk production in each county. Based on this, we estimate that Tulare 
County produces an average of 28,214,938 lbs of raw milk each day. 
3. Level One and Level Two Processing of Bulk Milk 
The next piece of information we need is the capacity of the processing facilities 
in each county. CDFA documents the amount of dairy products hauled in and between 
each of the specified haul regions (CDFA 2010b). Figure 5 shows the established milk 
haul region in California. These milk haul regions are made up of multiple counties. For 
our research, all of the hauling information for these regions must be broken down to the 
county level. We create a list of counties in each haul region to help with the calculations 
below. 
We need to determine the amount of bulk milk processed daily by the level one or 









These equations give us the amount of bulk milk that is processed in each county. 
We get the number of creameries in each county from CDFA (CDFA 2010a). Our final 
step is to determine the upper bounds of the processing capacity in each county.  We do 
this by first establishing a daily operating efficiency for the processing facilities. The 
daily operating efficiency is the rate at which the creameries process either bulk raw milk 
or other dairy products. A reasonable estimation of the operating efficiency is 88%. We 
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calculate this estimation by taking the amount of milk processed daily at Berkley Farms 
and dividing it by the total processing capability (Berkley Farms 1998). This means that 
there is 12% of excess processing capacity in each of the counties. We estimate the 
maximum operating capacity for the creameries to be: 
1 2 (1 (1 .88)).Level or ProcCap DailyMilkProcessedEachCounty= × + −   
These calculations give us the maximum capacity for the creameries in a county 
which, translates into the upper bound on the arc connecting Creamery1or2Start to 
Creamery1or2End as seen in Figure 5. In our example looking at Tulare County we have 
a maximum operating capacity for level 1 creameries of 28,057,787 lbs of bulk milk and 
level 2 creameries of 278,641 lbs of bulk milk. 
4. Transportation of Milk 
We also need the amount of trucking assets available in each county to transport 
bulk milk. According to Ruan Transportation (Ruan, 2011), the normal operating 
efficiency of transportation providers is 95%. Since Ruan is the largest transporter of bulk 
milk in California moving 80% of the bulk milk in the state.  
 Now we have an estimate for the operating efficiency of hauling bulk milk, we 
can determine the upper bound for the arc connecting FarmEnd to Trans1. Since the 
operating efficiency is 95% that means we have 5% additional hauling capacity. We 
determine the maximum hauling capacity for the movement of raw bulk milk in each 
county to be: 
(1 (1 .95)).RawMilkHaulingCap RawMilkProd= × + −  
For Tulare County, we estimate that to be 29,625,685 lbs. We use the same 
formulation to determine the maximum hauling capacity of bulk milk hauled from 
creamery1 to creamery2. For Tulare County, these are 29,460,677 and 261,226 lbs. 
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Figure 6.   Milk Haul Regions in California (From CDFA 2010d) 
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5. Demand for Bulk Milk 
We estimate the demand for milk in each county as follows. We measure the 
effects of shortages among different scenarios in terms of how much demand is not being 




CountyPop PercentLevel Consumed TotalBulkMilkConsumedLevel Demand × ×=
 
TotalBulkMilkConsumed is the total amount of dairy products consumed per 
person in one year. This information is from the USDA (USDA 2010). 
PercentLevel1Consumed is the percentage of total bulk milk that is used for level one 
processing. CountyPop is the population in each county in California, and the information 




CountyPop PercentLevel Consumed TotalBulkMilkConsumedLevel Demand × ×=
 
We estimate the demand for milk in Tulare County to be 689,949 lbs for level-one 
processed milk, and 18,886 lbs for level-two processed milk. 
  
Raw Milk Production and 
Transportation 
Level 1 Processing and 
Transportation 



















Tulare 28,200,000  29,600,000  28,100,000  29,500,000  279,000  261,000  690,000  18,900  
Table 1.   Data table for Tulare County of the capacities on the arcs in our full model. 
The capacities for each of these arcs are measured in lbs. 
D. MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
1. The Operator’s Problem 
We develop the operator’s problem to make sure that we have a basic 
understanding of the flow of bulk milk through our abstracted system. The goal of the 
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operator’s problem is to move milk throughout the network while satisfying the demand 
of both level one and level two processed milk in each of the counties in California. Our 
objective is to find an optimal solution where no shortages for the population exist. The 
optimal solution through our network informs us whether or not current production, 
hauling, and processing capacities are able to fully satisfy the demand for milk in 
California. 
 Sets:  
  
 t T∈    Time periods in T 
 n N∈    Nodes in network (alias n,i,j,c) 
 ( , , )i j t A∈   Arcs in network from node i to node j starting in time layer  




 ( , )in c t   Arcs going into node ( , )c t  
 ( , )out c t   Arcs going out of node ( , )c t  
 ( , , )start i j t   Node at which arc ( , , )i j t  starts 
 ( , , )end i j t   Node at which arc ( , , )i j t  ends 
 
 Data:  
 
 , ,i j tu    Upper limit on arc (i,j,t) 
 , ,i j tl    Lower limit on arc (i,j,t) 
 , ,i j tc    Importance on arc (i,j,t), { }, , 0,1i j tc ∈  
 v    Total milk flowing through system 
 
 Special Nodes: 
 
 a    Super source node 
 z    Super sink node 
 
   
 Variables:  
 
 , ,i j tY    Flow of pounds of milk on arc (i,j,t)  
 , ,i j tS    Shortage  in pounds of milk on arc (i,j,t) 
 
 Formulation:                     [dual variables] 
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 , , , ,, ( , , )
min i j t i j tY S i j t A
c S
∈
∑         (D0) 
  
 Subject to: 
 , ,
( , , )
a i t
a i t A
Y v
∈
− = −∑       [ ]aρ   (D1) 
 , ,
( , , )
i z t
i z t A
Y v
∈
=∑       [ ]zρ   (D2) 
 , , , ,
( , , ) ( , ) ( , , ) ( , )
0i c t c i t
i c t in c t c i t out c t
Y Y
∈ ∈
− =∑ ∑  ∀ nodes c on layer t  ,[ ]c tρ   (D3) 
 
 , , , ,i j t i j tY u≤   ( , , )i j t A∀ ∈     , ,[ ]i j tπ   (D4) 
 , ,0 i j tY≤   ( , , )i j t A∀ ∈       (D5) 
 , , , , , ,i j t i j t i j tY S l− − ≤ −  ( , , )i j t A∀ ∈     , ,[ ]i j tµ   (D6) 
 , ,0 i j tS≤   ( , , )i j t A∀ ∈       (D7)  
 
 Discussion: 
The objective function (D0) calculates the amount of shortages in our network 
during normal operations. Constraints (D1), (D2), and (D3) ensure that there is a balance 
of supply and demand to each of the nodes in our network. Constraint (D4) ensures that 
we do not exceed the capacity on any arc in our network. Constraints (D5) and (D7) 
makes sure that we have non-negativity for both our amount of bulk milk flowing as well 
as shortages seen on any given arc. Constraint (D6) determines if a shortage exists on arc 
(i,j). 
2. Attacker Defender Problem 
Building on this operator’s model, we present an AD model to determine where 
the critical nodes and arcs exist, and to do additional analysis on our scenarios in order to 
determine worst-case disruptions. An attack in our model is when we eliminate one of the 
nodes in our network in a specific time period. The nodes that we can attack are the nodes 
at the dairy farms, level one and level two processing facilities, and the hauling capacity 
in each of the counties. For example we analyze the effects of an attack on the dairy 
farms in Tulare County at time period two. 
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 Additional Sets: 
 
 ( , , )i j t B∈    Attackable arcs (i,j,t)  
 
 Additional Data: 
 M     Maximum number of attacks allowed 
 ( , , )r i j t    Reconstitution time of arc (i,j,t) 
 
 Additional Variables: 
 , ,i j tX     1 if arc(i,j,t) attacked, variable exists only if  





, , , , , , ' , ,, ( , , ) ( , , ) ' ( , , )
max min 4.1
t
i j t i j t i j t i j tY SX i j t A i j t B t t r i j t
c S X Y




∑ ∑ ∑    (A0) 




( , , ')
i j t
i j t B
X M
∈
≤∑         (A1) 
 { }, , ' 0,1i j tX ∈          (A2) 
 
Discussion: 
Our new objective function (A0) determines the shortage of bulk milk in pounds 
when attacks occur within the milk and dairy industry. We account for the reconstitution 
for the dairy farms, processing facilities, and transportation of bulk milk by introducing a 
reconstitution element, ( , , )r i j t . We penalize the flow on arc ( , , )i j t  if any arc ( , , ')i j t  
for ' ( , , )t t r i j t= −  and is attacked. We choose a penalty factor of 4.1 because flow on any 
arc can decrease the shortage by at most 4(max importance) based on the structure of our 
model. For example, if we attack the FarmStart to FarmEnd arc in Tulare County and if 
any milk goes through that arc we use our penalty factor of 4.1 because the penalized 
milk will also be moving through the two processing arcs, and transportation arc before 
reaching the population. We add the constraints (A1) to ensure that we do not exceed the 
maximum number of attacks that we identify. Constraints (A2) identify , , 'i j tX as a binary 
variable.  
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3. Solving AD Model 
We solve the AD model that we created in two steps. The first step is that we take 
the dual of the minimization of (A0). This allows us to compute , ,i j tX  indicating where a 
worst case disruption occurs. The second step to determine the optimal flow of bulk milk 
through our network is to solve the minimization of (A0) with , ,i j tX  fixed. The dual for 
(A0) is: 
Dual Variables (taken from duals of (D1)-(D4) and (D6)): 
 aρ  
 zρ  
 ,c tρ  
 , ,i j tπ  
 , ,i j tµ  
Formulation: 
, , ' , , , , , , , ,, , ' ( , , ) , , , ,
max
t





+ −∑ ∑ ∑    (DU0) 
Subject to: 
 0a zρ ρ− =        [ ]v   (DU1) 
 , , , ,i j t i j tcµ− ≤        , ,[ ]i j ts   (DU2) 
 ( , , ) ( , , ) , , , , , , '
' ( , , )
4.1
t
start i j t end i j t i j t i j t i j t
t t r i j t
Xρ ρ π µ
= −
 
− + + − ≤  
 
∑  , ,[ ]i j tY  (DU3) 
 , , 0i j tµ ≤          (DU4) 
 , , 0i j tπ ≤          (DU5) 





We now have the tools developed to begin our analysis on the milk and dairy 
industry in California. In the next chapter we explore the impact of a FMD outbreak that 
completely quarantines each of the counties, a worst case disruption with up to 15 attacks 
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within a 45 day window, and finally an isolation based scenario where we cut off 




We utilize our model with the data we collected to analyze the impact of three 
different scenarios on the milk and dairy industry. In these scenarios, we analyze (1) the 
effects of a FMD outbreak in each of the counties in California, (2) the worst case 
disruptions over a 45 day window with up to 15 different attacks, and (3) the shortages 
and flow of milk when there is a division separating Northern from Southern California 
due to large scale flooding.  For each of these scenarios, we use the General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) (GAMS, 2010) and is solved utilizing CPLEX 12.02 (ILOG, 
2007) on a personal computer with an Intel Core Duo CPU at 3.66 GHz.  
A. IMPACT FROM A FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK  
1. Scenario: Processed Milk Not Being Able to Reach Population 
The first scenario that we analyze is a FMD outbreak within a single county in 
California; we measure the resulting shortages of milk to the population in the state. We 
model a FMD outbreak by completely eliminating the production, processing and hauling 
capacities within the selected county. This simulates a quarantine of the milk process 
flow within the infected county. We also do not allow milk that has been processed from 
another county to enter the county that is quarantined. This type of scenario can be used 
for any situation that stops the production, processing, and movement of milk in a county. 
For this scenario, we use a seven day time layering to simulate the impact of a week-long 
quarantine of an infected county. We repeat this analysis for each county in California.  
The model for this scenario is made up of 8521 nodes and 12565 arcs. The 
computation time to solve is approximately 52 seconds for each county. 
Table 2 summarizes the shortages associated with a seven-day stoppage for each 
California County. One of the most interesting findings is that Los Angeles County ranks 
number one. We estimate that a seven-day stoppage to the production, processing, and 
movement of milk in Los Angeles will cause a shortage of milk throughout California of 
114,000,000 lbs. The reasoning for such a large shortage is because of the large 
population and processing facilities in Los Angeles.  
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This information helps us determine which counties are the most critical to the 
continuity of the milk and dairy industry. This enables us to plan for varying scenarios 
one of which, could be a FMD outbreak. Under a FMD outbreak we know which 
counties are critical, and this helps us determine what type of strategy to adopt when an 
outbreak occurs. Knowing the impact of county quarantines allow us to evaluate the 
relative merits of different strategies, for example, whether to slaughter infected cattle or 




 Shortage  
(lbs of Milk)  Rank County 
 Shortage 
(lbs of Milk)  
1 LosAngeles          114,000,000  30 Shasta               2,091,346  
2 SanDiego            37,192,527  31 Imperial               1,927,075  
3 Orange            34,953,574  32 Nevada               1,901,126  
4 Tulare            30,439,135  33 Amador               1,831,699  
5 Riverside            29,224,142  34 Kings               1,717,939  
6 SanBernadino            23,300,254  35 Madera               1,716,415  
7 SantaClara            20,609,193  36 Napa               1,554,949  
8 Sacramento            20,070,694  37 Humboldt               1,505,855  
9 Alameda            17,223,757  38 Calaveras               1,394,304  
10 ContraCosta            12,024,718  39 Sutter               1,069,514  
11 Fresno            10,569,579  40 Mendocino                  993,597  
12 Kern               9,672,985  41 Tuolumne                  842,629  
13 SanFrancisco               9,415,821  42 Sierra                  772,290  
14 Ventura               9,272,914  43 Lake                  753,847  
15 SanMateo               8,302,944  44 Plumas                  735,636  
16 SanJoaquin               7,793,339  45 Tehama                  706,027  
17 Placer               5,926,233  46 SanBenito                  635,814  
18 Stanislaus               5,893,968  47 Siskiyou                  515,437  
19 Sonoma               5,451,873  48 Lassen                  503,265  
20 Monterey               4,738,987  49 Inyo                  348,983  
21 Solano               4,702,772  50 DelNorte                  336,211  
22 SantaBarbara               4,700,728  51 Glenn                  326,799  
23 ElDorado               3,892,420  52 Colusa                  246,217  
24 SanLuisObispo               3,083,003  53 Mariposa                  205,464  
25 SantaCruz               2,958,827  54 Trinity                  163,579  
26 Marin               2,895,682  55 Mono                  149,282  
27 Merced               2,832,987  56 Modoc                  105,168  
28 Butte               2,547,241  57 Alpine                     12,022  
29 Yuba               2,448,347  58 Yolo 0 
 
Table 2.   Ranking of counties by shortages of bulk milk in California caused by a FMD 
outbreak. The amount of shortage is in pounds of bulk milk quarantine is over 
a seven day time period. 
2. Scenario: Processed Milk Able to Reach Population 
We continue our analysis of this scenario by adjusting our parameters to allow 
fully processed milk to move into a county where a quarantine occurs. This enables 
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demand to be satisfied from a county that is not affected by the quarantine. With these 




(lbs of Milk)  
1 Tulare 33,150,000 
2 Riverside 5,420,000 
3 Yuba 2,450,000 
4 SanDiego 1,930,000 
5 Placer 1,900,000 
6 ElDorado 1,830,000 
7 Amador 1,390,000 
8 Calaveras 850,000 
9 Nevada 770,000 
10 Sierra 740,000 
11 Plumas 500,000 
12 Kern 350,000 
13 Tuolumne 210,000 
14 Inyo 150,000 
15 Lassen 100,000 
16 Humboldt 9,000 
 
Table 3.   Ranking of counties by shortages of bulk milk in California caused by a FMD 
outbreak when process milk can move to consumers in a quarantined county. 
The amount of shortage is in pounds of bulk milk and the quarantine is over a 
seven day time period. 
In this updated scenario, we estimate that there are only sixteen counties that will 
cause shortages of milk in California if a FMD scenario occurs. Table 3 ranks these 
counties and the results are interesting. A quarantine in Tulare County over seven days 
has the greatest impact to shortages felt within all of California. This is caused by the fact 
that Tulare County is the top milk producing and processing county in California. 
Quarantines in Riverside and San Diego impact shortages because they interrupt the flow 
of milk in Southern California where there is not enough capacity to fulfill consumer 
demand. These results are also affected by the isolation of certain parts of California due 
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to the fact that no milk is able to move any further on the transportation network. This is 
the case in Placer and Yuba Counties. 
B. RESILIENCY OF THE MILK AND DAIRY INDUSTRY IN CALIFORNIA 
WHEN FACING WORST CASE SCENARIOS 
The next part of our analysis seeks to identify the most critical nodes in 
California’s milk and dairy network. In this scenario, we consider combinations of 1 
through 15 attacks, each which may be targeted on any farm, processing facility, or 
hauling capacity in any county in California, with a time layering of 45 days. As part of 
this scenario, we include reconstitution times of farms to be one week, processing 
facilities to be one month (30 days), and hauling capacity to be one day. The 
reconstitution time is the amount of time needed to return to normal operation following 
an attack. We choose one week for a dairy farm because we think that moving dairy cows 
from one area to another would take approximately one week. We choose 30 days for the 
processing facilities because we assume that due to the size of the plants and the 
specialized equipment that they use it would take longer for them to get operational after 
an attack. Finally we choose one day for the reconstitution time for the hauling capacity 
because the transportation companies can reroute their milk hauling trucks easily. A one 
day reconstitution time seems reasonable. 
The model for this scenario is made up of 54,767 nodes and 80,775 arcs. The 
computation time to solve for all 1 through 15 attacks is approximately 13 hours and 15 
minutes. 
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of varying attacks from 1 to 15 on the state of 
California. We can see from the graph that California does not begin to feel the impact 
from attacks until five attacks are reached. The total production of bulk milk in a 45 day 
time period is 4,451,000,000 lbs and the demand for bulk milk over this same time period 
in California is 2,745,000,000 lbs. The first four attacks significantly reduce the amount 
of milk that may be shipped out of state from California, but does not create significant 
in-state shortages. With 15 attacks, the total shortage of bulk milk is 2,783,000,000 lbs.  
This translates into a shortage of bulk milk to California residents of 1,075,000,000 lbs. 
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The amount of overall shortage is 63% of the total milk produced, and California has a 
39% shortage of in-state demand for bulk milk. 
Upon further examination we can see that the attacks are centered around the 
major milk producing counties in California. Figure 8 visually identifies the counties 
where arracks occur for one, five, ten, and fifteen attacks. With only one attack, the attack 
occurs in Tulare County against the dairy farms and causes a shortage of 200,000,000 lbs 
of bulk milk.  
When we look at five attacks, they occur in Tulare County at the dairy farms, 
Kern County at creamery1, Merced County at the dairy farm, Kings County at the 
hauling capacity node for level two milk, and Fresno County at creamery1. The overall 
shortage with five attacks is 1,800,000,000 lbs and the shortage specifically felt in 
California is 92,000,000 lbs.   
At 10 attacks the counties that get attacked are Butte County at the hauling 
capacity node for level two milk, Fresno County at creamery1, Glenn County at the dairy 
farms, Kern County at creamery1, Kings County at the hauling capacity node for level 
two milk, Madera County at the dairy farm, Merced County at the dairy farm, Riverside 
County at the dairy farm, Sonoma County at the hauling capacity node for level two milk, 
and Tulare County at the dairy farm. The overall shortage with ten counties is 
2,772,000,000 lbs and the shortage felts in California is 992,000,000 lbs. 
The final scenario that we examine is what happens to the milk supply when 15 
attacks are present. The counties that get attacked are Butte County at the hauling 
capacity node for level two milk, Del Norte County at the dairy farm, Fresno County at 
creamery1, Glenn County at the dairy farm, Humboldt County at creamery1, Kern 
County at creamery1, Kings County at the hauling capacity node for level two milk, 
Madera County at the dairy farm, Merced County at the dairy farm, Riverside County at 
the dairy farm, Sacramento County at the dairy farm, Sonoma County at the hauling 
capacity node for level two milk, Tehama County at the farm, and Tulare County at the 
dairy farm. The overall shortage with 15 counties is 2,783,000,000 lbs and the shortage 
felts in California is 1,075,000,000 lbs. 
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Figure 7.   Graph of the results from 15 attacks over a 45 day time period. This graph 
show the shortages in bulk milk felt throughout California  
The results from 1 to 15 attacks on the milk and dairy industry are interesting 
because they highlight the areas where an intelligent adversary will concentrate their 
attacks. These results also give us an initial indication on the resilience of the milk and 
dairy industry. It takes four attacks before shortages are felt by the residents in California, 
assuming that California will export less milk out of state in these instances.  
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Figure 8.   Illustration of which counties are attacked in our AD model of the milk and 
dairy industry. The counties that are attacked are highlighted in yellow. The 
figure for 1 and 5 attacks highlight the counties to which the California 
Milk and dairy industry is most sensitive. Multiple attack strategies exist 
that cause the same worst-case shortage. The pictures above show one 
specific attack strategy for the scenarios depicted. 
C. IMPACT FROM SPLITTING NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA 
The final scenario that we examine is a break in the arcs connecting the 
distribution of milk between Northern and Southern California. This scenario simulates 
the impact of a natural disaster to the transportation network of the milk and dairy 
industry between Northern and Southern California. An example of such a natural 
disaster is a large scale flood. We run this scenario over a 7 day time period and measure 
the impact.  Finally, we test two different cuts between the North and the South. The first 
is a cut between Monterey and San Luis Obispo, Madera and Fresno, and finally Merced 
and Fresno Counties which, we call “cut A”. The second test we did was to cut San Luis 
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Obispo and Santa Barbara, Kings and Kern, and Tulare and Kerns Counties which, we 
call “cut B”.  
For each cut the model is made up of 8521 nodes and 12565 arcs. The 
computation time to solve for each county is approximately 52 seconds. 
 
Figure 9.   Flow of milk in California when there is a cut between Monterey and San 
Luis Obispo, Madera and Fresno, and finally Merced and Fresno Counties. 
The arcs connecting the milk and dairy industry between counties have 
varying thicknesses to account for differing amounts of milk flowing 
between them. 
In the presence of “cut A”, all of the demand for bulk milk in each the counties is 
filled and there are no shortages. You can see the flow of milk in this scenario in Figure 
9. This means that all of the counties are able to produce enough milk and utilize their 
capacity for processing and distributing milk to satisfy all of the demand. 
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With “cut B”, we do have shortages in the southern counties in California. The 
total shortage in California is 209,264,000lbs of bulk milk. You can see the flow of milk 
in this scenario in Figure 10. The amount of shortage in each county is highlighted in 
Table 2. When we do this cut there is not enough production to meet the demands in 
Southern California. The counties in Northern California are able to get all of their 
demand filled. 
 
Figure 10.   Flow of milk in California when there is a cut between San Luis Obispo and 
Santa Barbara, Kings and Kern, and Tulare and Kerns Counties. The chart 
at the right shows the comparison between the shortages of milk in each 
county compared to the total demand of milk over seven days. 
The shortage of milk by caused by cut B is very interesting and gives us insight 
into where the critical arcs exist in California. When we compare cut A to cut B we see 
that it is more important to keep the major milk producing counties such as Tulare 
County connected to the Southern Counties than to the Northern Counties, in the split. 
Shortages arise because demand is not able to be met in heavily populated counties, 
namely Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego. This information can help planners decide 
 37 
where to invest in the milk and dairy industry to ensure that enough milk is flowing to the 
through the milk and dairy network, or develop plans to minimize the impact of shortages 














Table 4.   Bulk milk shortage in Southern California Counties when there is a cut 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Milk moves through the milk and dairy industry in California extremely rapidly 
and understanding the impact caused by deliberate or non-deliberate interruptions is 
important to estimating where vulnerabilities may exist in this industry. Two of the key 
reasons for studying the milk and dairy industry are the economic impact that disruptions 
may cause, and the number of people affected by shortages of milk. We focus our 
analysis on the production, processing, and distribution of bulk milk in California. Our 
analysis gives us key insights into the movement of bulk milk and how disruptions affect 
the California consumers.  
The results from the scenarios we ran show us what factors to look at when faced 
with decisions that could negatively impact the production, processing, and distribution 
of milk. Depending on the scenario and the severity of a quarantine we realize that it is 
more important to examine the size of the population in the county and the processing 
capacity than the production capacity. We learn that it is important to ensure that there is 
enough production and processing capacity in the southern counties in California to 
satisfy the demands of the large populated areas (e.g., Los Angeles, San Diego, and 
Orange Counties). We also found that we can have up to four disruptions in a 45 day 
window before shortages in the supply of milk will necessarily impact the residents in 
California. We do assume that any shortages that are realized will first impact the milk 
that is being exported to another state. 
The analysis and results in this thesis have the potential to be helpful to CDFA 
and CalEMA. Specifically, our analysis of the milk and dairy industry can illuminate 
where vulnerabilities may exist. This can help CDFA and CalEMA in justifying 
additional funding to mitigate the impact from vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an 
intelligent attacker. It can also help them develop Continuity of Operations plans for 
specific scenarios such as a FMD outbreak. 
This research is just the beginning when it comes to analysis on the milk and 
dairy industry that can be accomplished to help decision makers at the state and national 
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levels. Our results are derived from notional data that we found primarily through open 
source information. In the future, if more detailed information on the milk and dairy is 
available, then results from future analysis can be even better defined. The model we 
built and used can be refined even further and polished to eventually become a tool to be 
used to analyze the milk and dairy industry by CDFA and CalEMA. The techniques that 
we used in determining the size and scope of the milk and dairy network can be updated 
easily so other agricultural commodities can be analyzed for their vulnerabilities.  
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APPENDIX  DATA TABLE LISTING THE CAPACITIES FOR 
ALL OF THE MILK AND DAIRY INDUSTRY COMPONENTS IN 
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Alameda 0  0  0  0  0  0  2,390,000  65,600  
Alpine 0  0  0  0  0  0  1,670  46  
Amador 0  0  0  0  0  0  60,800  1,660  
Butte 14,100  14,800  46,300  48,600  0  0  354,000  9,700  
Calaveras 0  0  0  0  0  0  75,000  2,050  
Colusa 0  0  0  0  0  0  34,200  937  
ContraCosta 0  0  0  0  0  0  1,670,000  45,800  
DelNorte 234,000  246,000  71,400  74,900  0  0  46,800  1,280  
ElDorado 0  0  0  0  0  0  287,000  7,840  
Fresno 6,620,000  6,950,000  8,970,000  9,420,000  89,100  83,500  1,470,000  40,200  
Glenn 1,000,000  1,050,000  648,000  680,000  0  0  45,400  1,240  
Humboldt 891,000  936,000  547,000  575,000  0  0  208,000  5,700  
Imperial 429,000  450,000  0  0  0  0  268,000  7,330  
Inyo 0  0  0  0  0  0  27,800  760  
Kern 9,570,000  10,000,000  4,660,000  4,890,000  46,300  43,400  1,300,000  35,500  
Kings 10,400,000  10,900,000  13,200,000  13,900,000  131,000  123,000  239,000  6,540  
Lake 0  0  0  0  0  0  105,000  2,870  
Lassen 0  0  0  0  0  0  55,400  1,520  
LosAngeles 0  0  17,900,000  18,800,000  922,000  864,000  15,800,000  433,000  
Madera 4,220,000  4,430,000  4,840,000  5,080,000  48,000  45,000  239,000  6,530  
Marin 531,000  558,000  473,000  496,000  5,840  5,470  403,000  11,000  
Mariposa 0  0  0  0  0  0  28,600  782  
Mendocino 0  0  41,100  43,100  508  476  138,000  3,780  
Merced 15,000,000  15,700,000  13,900,000  14,600,000  148,000  139,000  394,000  10,800  
Modoc 0  0  0  0  0  0  14,600  400  
Mono 0  0  0  0  0  0  20,800  568  
Monterey 0  0  1,650,000  1,730,000  61,200  57,400  659,000  18,000  
Napa 0  0  0  0  0  0  216,000  5,920  
Nevada 0  0  0  0  0  0  157,000  4,300  
Orange 0  0  0  0  0  0  4,860,000  133,000  
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Plumas 0  0  0  0  0  0  32,300  884  
Riverside 2,740,000  2,870,000  2,210,000  2,320,000  1,100,000  1,030,000  3,410,000  93,400  
Sacramento 885,000  929,000  456,000  479,000  0  0  2,250,000  61,600  
SanBenito 0  0  2,470,000  2,590,000  91,800  86,100  88,400  2,420  
SanBernadino 0  0  32,600  34,200  0  0  3,240,000  88,700  
SanDiego 147,000  154,000  0  0  0  0  4,900,000  134,000  
SanFrancisco 0  0  0  0  0  0  1,310,000  35,800  
SanJoaquin 5,800,000  6,090,000  0  0  0  0  1,080,000  29,700  
SanLuisObispo 0  0  88,000  92,400  873  819  429,000  11,700  
SanMateo 0  0  0  0  0  0  1,150,000  31,600  
SantaBarbara 0  0  176,000  185,000  1,750  1,640  654,000  17,900  
SantaClara 0  0  0  0  0  0  2,870,000  78,400  
SantaCruz 0  0  0  0  0  0  411,000  11,300  
Shasta 0  0  15,400  16,200  0  0  291,000  7,960  
Sierra 0  0  0  0  0  0  5,100  140  
Siskiyou 36,400  38,200  23,800  25,000  0  0  71,700  1,960  
Solano 0  0  26,800  28,100  0  0  654,000  17,900  
Sonoma 1,520,000  1,590,000  1,420,000  1,490,000  17,500  16,400  758,000  20,800  
Stanislaus 10,300,000  10,800,000  13,500,000  14,100,000  143,000  134,000  820,000  22,400  
Sutter 0  0  15,400  16,200  0  0  149,000  4,070  
Tehama 275,000  288,000  231,000  243,000  0  0  98,200  2,690  
Trinity 0  0  0  0  0  0  22,700  623  
Tulare 28,200,000  29,600,000  28,100,000  29,500,000  279,000  261,000  690,000  18,900  
Tuolumne 0  0  0  0  0  0  88,600  2,430  
Ventura 0  0  0  0  0  0  1,290,000  35,300  
Yolo 0  0  26,800  28,100  0  0  320,000  8,760  
Yuba 178,000  187,000  61,700  64,800  0  0  117,000  3,210  
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